Chinese Bombs and Chinese Aid

The past week's headlines are significant for highlighting the two potential manifestations of China's growing global clout. First, China announced that it had successfully tested anti-missile technology. Four days later, after Haiti was devastated by a magnitude-7.0 earthquake, China announced that it would provide $4.4 million worth of aid to support the global effort.

The Costs of Imperialism

A friend recently sent me a presentation at TED by a doctor named Hans Rosling, who has already gained some fame at TED for his first talk, in which he made statistics more visually palatable and effective for learning. In the latest video, which you can view below, Rosling estimates that China and India will reach the per capita income level of Western countries by 2048. Seeing as growth models often change, this is open to debate.

Taiwan Should Say 'No' To U.S. Arms

Recently, RealClearWorld, the international sister site to RealClearPolitics, published my op-ed on the recent movement in the Obama Administration toward selling arms to Taiwan. Here's a link to the op-ed on RealClearWorld. But for convenience, I've included the full text below. As always, I would be glad to hear your thoughts.

December 11, 2009
By Kevin Slaten

KAOHSIUNG, Taiwan - The U.S. might make a final decision for a new arms deal with Taiwan in the next two weeks. This weapons package should be put on hold, not because it's inconvenient for U.S.-China relations, but because it threatens the Taiwanese people. In fact, not one of these three countries has an interest in seeing this deal to fruition. And at best, the timing is terrible

On Dec. 9, the deputy assistant secretary of state for defense trade in the Obama Administration revealed that the U.S. is getting close to another major arms package to Taiwan, including Black Hawk helicopters, advanced Patriot missiles and diesel submarines. As expected, China responded a day later, unequivocally opposing the potential sale. President Obama's decision to notify Congress of the sale could come as early as the third week in December after Obama returns from Copenhagen.

This arms package should be frozen where it stands, namely in Congressional discussions and Pentagon war planners.

The common line of argument is that such a deal may damage the U.S.-China relationship, which is packed with important issue like climate change and trade. At the very least, it could halt the progress of Sino-U.S. military-to-military (mil-mil) exchanges.

In all likelihood, however, this arms deal would do little to affect negotiations on central economic and environmental issues. After past U.S.-Taiwan arms deals, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has not linked the security and economic realms. Despite U.S. arms deliveries to Taiwan from 2000-2007, trade between the U.S.-China grew 130% during the same period, from $116 billion to $386 billion.

But concerns over mil-mil exchanges may be more justified. In 2008, the Bush Administration approved an arms package to Taiwan, which resulted in the PRC suspending mil-mil talks. Given China's rapidly growing defense capabilities, the future of security in the Asian Pacific region depends on a more robust and less suspicious military relationship between the U.S. and China.

Despite this, the U.S.-Taiwan arms deal is much worse for the prospects of the Taiwanese people than that of their American or Chinese counterparts. Unlike the Sino-U.S. relationship, the Sino-Taiwanese relationship is not a conference of two equal powers, and Taiwan cannot afford to let its recent progress with the Mainland fall apart.

Right now, representatives of the PRC and Taiwan are negotiating an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which is a partial free trade agreement (FTA). This trade pact is essential to the continuing competitiveness of Taiwan in the East Asian economy because a free trade zone is fast emerging in region. The PRC has been in talks with Korea and Japan over a trilateral FTA and a China-ASEAN FTA comes into force on Jan. 1, 2010.

President Ma Ying-jeou hopes to sign the ECFA by spring of next year. If this trade deal were to fall through, the consequences for the Taiwanese people would be serious. According to the Council of Labor Affairs in Taiwan, the country's economy stands to lose 0.2% GDP and 47,000 jobs if the ECFA were not signed. And this is on top of the expected 2.5% contraction of Taiwan's economy in 2009, which is heavily reliant on exports. Even worse, none of these numbers can take into account the damage to Taiwan's GDP once business and investment start moving to ASEAN and China in 2010.

An arms package between the U.S. and Taiwan would jeopardize the ECFA. The PRC has a much smaller economic stake in the ECFA than Taiwan. China's GDP is growing at a brisk 8% clip, and the Chinese do not have the pressure of being left out of a looming East Asian free trade zone, namely because China is central to that zone. So although the Mainland might want to sign the ECFA, it loses little from making an example of the arms deal by putting the ECFA off until 2011. But the Taiwanese cannot afford any stalling.

The gains of this arms deal for Taiwan, however, are minimal. China has near 1,500 missiles pointed at Taiwan, around 70 submarines, and another 70 combat ships. The Chinese navy could overwhelm Taiwanese defenses. Yet Taiwan's deterrent against Chinese invasion has always been, and will remain, the economic disincentive for the PRC to invade as well as a strong American military presence in the Asian Pacific. The handful of missiles, helicopters and submarines included in this arms package will not change that.

Here in Taiwan, few people foresee a war with China. But economic stagnation is an everyday reality. Taiwanese, especially young people, are uncertain if they can get a job out of college.

Of course, the Obama and Ma Administrations do not want to be viewed as acquiescent to China by their respective critiques, so they might want this arms deal for domestic political appeal. But neither has much to lose from waiting until next year. Besides, the potential damage to Taiwan's economy could quickly override any gains of an arms package to President Ma's approval ratings.

So other than a small (and forgettable) political gain for Ma and Obama, these arms would increase no one's security.

Kevin Slaten was a junior fellow in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Now, he lives in Taiwan on a Fulbright Grant. His opinions in no way reflect the views of the State Department or Foundation for Scholarly Exchange. He blogs at www.kevinslaten.blogspot.com.

Still Enemies

A North Korean ship and South Korean ship faced off in a bit of armed violence yesterday (10 November). Now, this was far from the resumption of Korean War-like hostilities, but the spat is interesting for what it means: North and South Korea are still enemies.

The hostilities took place about 11 kilometers east of Daecheong Island, marked by the red 'X' in the upper-left corner of the image.

Some analysts point out that this is probably an attempt by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) to demand US attention just ahead of Obama's trip to East Asia, which begins this Thursday. Although this may be true, the very fact that the Koreas are able to exchange fire means something about the potential for Korean relations in the near- to mid-term future. Whether or not there is diplomatic positioning involved, if both sides are still willing to fire on one another, then they still staunchly view one another as enemies.

Although that may seem far from a revelation, the implications for Korean relations and stability in Northeast Asia are important. If North and South Korea cannot get past "enemies" to, at least, "suspicious neighbors", then a true Korean Peninsula peace is still a good distance down the road.

Moreover, if this true, then there are larger consequences for the region. First, China will still be able to control North Korea as a lever in gaining the attention of South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Second, the US and China will still have the Korean tension as a secondary issue of disagreement in the Sino-US relationship, given that the US seeks a denuclearized Korea while China may not necessarily find such an outcome in their favor right now. Third, until that peninsula is at peace, Japan will seriously consider a missile defense shield (via the US), and this is a tense issue in both the Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relationship.

One of these days, the Koreans will stop shooting at one another.

Buff Humans are Weird

I was listening to some recent podcasts of Science Friday, a weekly program on National Public Radio, and came across a segment that discussed humans' innate propensity for long-running or endurance exercise. (Here's the audio and here's the transcript.) Dr. Daniel Lieberman, a biologist from Harvard, was the show's guest. Here is the key part of what he said:

"If you think about humans as sprinters, we're actually really pathetic. So Usain Bolt, the world's fastest sprinter, can run in -about nine and a half meters in a second, right. So he's pretty fast compared to the rest of us. But he can only do that for about 10 or 20 seconds, and then he'll run out of gas."

"A lion, if it was chasing Usain - and I hope that doesn't happen - a lion will run twice as fast as Usain, 20 meters a second, and can do it for four minutes. So as sprinters, we're just pathetic. We're always going to be lunch for the carnivores. But what we're astonishing at is really long-distance, endurance running. So there's really no other creature that's as good as us at running in very long distances at pretty good clips."

I don't debate what Dr. Lieberman is arguing at all. However, given the fact that modern humans have evolved for endurance activities (i.e. aerobic exercise), I'm interested in the implications for those humans who pursue the exact opposite: sprinting activities (i.e. anaerobic exercise).

(Full disclosure: my interest in this issue is, in part, engendered by my lifestyle. I've been an avid weightlifter for 12 years, currently weightlift 5 or 6 days in a week, and on the days that I don't weightlift, I usually go to the track and do sprints!)

The body of a person who predominantly does aerobic exercise, henceforth a "runner", is different from that of a person who usually does anaerobic exercise, a "sprinter". Runners have less muscle and, often, a stronger cardiovascular system (i.e. their pulse and blood pressure is better) than sprinters. If humans are better equipped to be runners, then it can be safely assumed that the traits of a runner are easier to obtain than the traits of a sprinter. In other words, it takes less time and energy to "look like" a runner than to "look like" a sprinter.

The implications are interesting to ponder. Since humans that "look like" sprinters are more rare, there at least are two possibilities sociologically: 1) having physical sprinter traits, like more muscle, raises one's status because the traits are rare or 2) having these sprinter traits damages one's status because the person is viewed as a deviant -- they are outside the normal body type.

General examples of both can be observed, depending on the social context. Muscular men certainly seem to benefit in status among Americans; how many women reading this have not ogled over beach pictures of Matthew Mcconaughey or Hugh Jackman? (Or for that matter, how many men reading this haven't done the same thing?) On the other hand, professional bodybuilders, like Jay Cutler, are often viewed as "freaks", which is code for "deviant from the norm".

Although you may disagree that any of the above men should be viewed as more admirable because of their bodies, you are likely to agree that these men are, at least, notable for their bodies. Contrast this with a talented person like Bill Gates, who is admirable for many things, but his body would probably not be one the things that you'd mention about him.

Of course, the status ascribed by a person's body type also does not exist in a vacuum. Our status depends on the group we are in at any a given moment as well as other social traits (like our education, income, power, or language).

It might seem all-too-obvious that a muscular body (for men or women) can be viewed as desirable. My question, though, is this: is muscularity sometimes desirable because it is rarer amongst humans? (Remember, our natural inclination is to have a runner's body.) Or is the status of muscularity like the status of wearing bell-bottom jeans in the 1970s -- a social trend that will just die off in due time like most other trends?

Perhaps it's a bit of both. But I'm done pondering it for now because I need to go to the gym to lift some weights.

International Law and the Double Standard

A common criticism of international law -- both existing law and potential law -- is that states have their own interests and will only comply with or form new law when it aligns with those interests. Recently, Eric Posner argued this on Foreign Policy. Putting aside his weak contention that President Obama has been as equally loathsome of international law as President G.W. Bush, Posner's main theme is that countries' interests don't align enough to make international law worthwhile.

The problem with this argument is that it is being applied selectively to international law -- it's a double standard. In domestic politics, every individual citizen has their own interests. That is a given. In representative democracies, like the United States or most any other democratic country, congresspeople or parliamentarians have very distinct interests (that may or may not represent their constituents). But scholars and commentators don't disparage democracies because various people or politicians have interests. To have interests is derived directly from having needs, and to have needs means you're alive.

So, the argument that "unaligned interests makes cooperation hopeless" is absurd. If this were true, then we ought to all give up on any form of society or government.

The primary difference between international and national law is enforcement, not interests. While in the US, for example, an individual can be arrested and convicted for murder, there are no world police (technically speaking). And mechanisms like the United Nations Security Council or the International Criminal Court are hampered by a lack of strong enforcement mechanisms. (The ICC has been struggling recently to stay above water in this respect.)

But the lack of international enforcement is a choice and, perhaps, rather natural. International law is, historically, still in its nascency. The first attempt at truly global law didn't begin until the attempts at forming the League of Nations in 1916, so in this sense, international law hasn't even hit the century mark.

Compare this to the European Union. The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, was the initial attempt at Europe's first security-based international system of law. It was a full 344 years before the European Union -- states linked by domestically enforceable law -- was formed through the Treaty of Maastricht. And even now, there is no single EU military or police force. Each state's police force within the EU must, under law, uphold EU regulations.

The world is composed of many more individuals and states, so it seems predictable that the development of an international legal system should take so long.

Ironically, Posner makes a key observation in the development of effective international law: "International law is only as strong as the states with an interest in upholding it." Precisely. America's domestic system of law is upheld, at base, because the individuals and entities in that system consent to it. Americans each have an interest in social order, lest chaos abound. Likewise, international law makes the world more efficient, predictable, and (in the long run) safer.

Given so many disparate interests, we're unlikely to see a world government in our lifetimes. But today's arguments over international law may seem laughable in 2200 -- like arguments in 1733 over a religious-refugee-founded, world-dominating union of fifty states spanning the North American continent seem today.

Peace in the Taiwan Strait?

Since President Ma took office in Taiwan last March, the relationship between China and Taiwan has improved rapidly. The two governments have concluded multiple agreements on trade, travel, and finance. And an impending Taiwan-China free trade agreement (FTA) -- called the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement -- could link the two entities irreversibly.

In fact, relations have warmed sufficiently, it seems, to merit some sort of punditry tipping point. Some are beginning to talk about the consequences of a Taiwan-China peace agreement for East Asia and the US. But one piece in particular, written by Philip Saunders and Scott Kastner, is notable for its clear-minded analysis on what a peace deal across the Strait might look like and, further, what it might do to affect other political calculations in the region.

In short, a true peace agreement -- in the sense of unification -- is far off. The Taiwanese political climate is not prepared for such a step. But, as Saunders and Kastner point out, "an interim peace agreement -- trading a Taiwanese commitment not to move toward independence for a Chinese commitment not to use force -- seems increasingly possible."

This is a confidence-building measure (CBM) proposal, and I would suggest reading the full article for the details. My general take is that it is not only an opportune time for such an agreement, but it is also a necessary agreement. First, any deep step toward unification is going to require baby steps that prepare both the Chinese and the Taiwanese for the idea of being more integrated economically and politically. Second, and more importantly, Taiwan needs this FTA with China. If Taiwan holds off much longer on economic integration with East Asia, then it will lose a significant amount of jobs and investment in the next decade as these travel to countries in the East Asian bloc, like Thailand or Vietnam.

There is only one argument the authors make with which I disagree. They rightly mention that for unification to ever be a real prospect, the divergent identities of Taiwanese and Chinese people need to be addressed. In other words, people on both sides need to get comfortable enough with one another to be able to see themselves as "one" national people. Here's what the article says:

"A peace agreement might help address this issue through the exchange of 'identity goods,' measures that allow one side the chance to influence the other side's perception of national identity. Expanded media, educational, and people-to-people exchanges could give Beijing a chance to persuade people on Taiwan about the benefits of unification, and allow Taiwan a chance to press for greater openness and political changes in China that would make unification more attractive."

I think the final phrase here is unrealistic. Without a drastic change in the domestic political climate of China, there is little to no chance that the Communist Party (CCP) would allow Taiwan or Taiwanese people to press for more political openness in China. At this point, it won't even allow its own people to flirt with such propositions, so why would the authors think that the CCP would permit the Taiwanese -- the people of its "rogue province" -- to press for a more liberal political system?

Putting this criticism aside, I think Saunders and Kastner have it right on expanding educational and people-to-people exchanges. As is usually the case, the potential for great change lies in the perspective of new generations. As young Taiwanese and Chinese come to know and accept each other, the "otherness" of their parents' generation will no longer make sense to them. It is these young people that will one day shake hands and say, "peace".